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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The jurisdiction of the Court is established by 78-2a-3(2)(f), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Rule 26(2)(a), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final Judgment and Sentence finding the 
Defendant/Appellant-(hereafter "KACSUTA") guilty of POSSESSION OF 
A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT, TO DISTRIBUTE, a Second Degree 
Felony, in violation of Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) and 58-37-
8(5)(a)(ix) and (x) and 58-37-8(5)(c), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, the Judgment being entered after a Jury Trial and 
ordering KACSUTA to be committed to the Utah State Prison. 
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ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
J\ 9 
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT RECEIVED 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
The Standard of Review requires the Defendant to show, first, 
that his counsel's rendered a deficient performance in some 
demonstrable manner and/or that his counsel's performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment 
and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the Defendant. 
Bundv v, Deland, 763 P.2 803,805 (Utah 1988). 
B. 
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS OR LIMIT AT TRIAL. 
C. 
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
The Standard of Review requires a review of the evidence and 
all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in a 
light most favorable to a jury verdict, and requiring reversal only 
when the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or so inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have had a doubt. State vs. 
Verde. 770 P.2 616,617 (Utah 1989). 
D, 
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR REDUCTION,,OF JUDGMENT AT FINAL SENTENCING. 
The Standard of Review is whether or not the Trial Court 
abused it's discretion. State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2 1232 (Utah 
1993). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTE and/or RULES 
The statutory and regulatory provisions which are believed to 
be determinative in this matter include Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) and 58-37-8(5)(a)(ix) and (x) and 58-37-
8(5)(c), 1953, as amended. Utah Rulejs of Evidence, Sections 401, 
403, 404(b) and 803(15) and (24). 
MATURE OF THE CASE 
KACSUTA's conviction results from his arrest on March 17, 
1994. KACSUTA was in his apartment with several friends, some of 
whom were juveniles. KACSUTA's probation officer, RODNEY SEYMOUR, 
made an unannounced visit, took KACSUTA into the hall and searched 
him. KACSUTA had been a week late in reporting to the probation 
department for the month of March. The search of KACSUTA's person 
turned up three baggies of marijuana in varying quantities, 5.2 
grams, 2.8 grams and 0.4 grams. KACSUTA also had Fifty-Eight 
($58.00) Dollars in cash on his person. 
Later, KACSUTA's apartment was searched by Beaver City Police 
Officers RUSSELL L. ERICKSON and CAMERON NOEL. They found a pocket 
knife, two parts of a disassembled pipe, namely the bowl and 
screen, a clip, scales, and marijuana stem and seeds. KACSUTA was 
not charged with possession of drug paraphernalia. However, he was 
charged with POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH THE INTENT 
TO DISTRIBUTE, a SecO^ „, ®f$qtMm itf^ lony and POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, mmilMmmMm**nor. 
A preliminary he&WMMMmm&m 19th day of April, 1994, 
and KACSUTA was bound ovir"arfTJTOP'Fduhts for jury trial. KACSUTA 
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was appointed the Public Defender to represent him. On the 17th 
day of June, 1994* KACSUTA's appointed counsel moved to suppress 
or limit evidence generated from KACSUTAFs arrest and the search of 
his apartment. Said motion was particular in moving to suppress 
evidence of KACSUTA's bad character, such as prior criminal conduct 
and/ot prior use of marijuana. KACSUTA's motion was denied and the 
evidence was introduced at trial. 
dn the 19th day of July, 1994, KACSUTA moved to reduce the 
judgment of conviction and the same was denied by the Trial Court. 
KACSUTA was sentenced to incarceration at the Utah State Prison 
with no fine imposed and a recommendation that he be screened and 
considered for drug treatment at the earliest possible time, while 
in prison, as a condition of parole. 
PROCEEDINGS and DISPOSITION AT TRIAL 
KACSUTA was charged on Count I, POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a Second Degree Felony, in 
violation of Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), 58-37-8(5)(a)(ix) and (x) 
and 58-37-8(5)(c), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and Count 
II, POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Class A Misdemeanor, in 
violation of Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), 58-37-8(5)(a)(ix) and (x) 
and 58-37-8(5)(c), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. KACSUTA 
was appointed counsel and a preliminary hearing was held on the 
19th day of April, 1994. KACSUTA ya<8 bqund over for jury trial on 
both counts and the matMMIWMiiM^ on the 22nd day of 
June, 1994. On or a b o u ^ l i m ^ 1994, KACSUTA by and 
through counsel, moved to ^ « O T ^ generated from 
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hitfl &nd search of his apartment. This included a motion to 
suppress testimony regarding KACSUTA's prior bad character. The 
Motion to Suppress was denied and the evidence was introduced at 
trial. 
At trial, KACSUTA was found guilty of COUNT I, POSSESSION OF 
A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a Second Degree 
Felony. On or about the 17th day of July, 1994, KACSUTA moved for 
reduction of judgment of conviction, and the same was denied by the 
Court. KACSUTA was sentenced to incarceration in the Utah State 
Prison with no fine imposed and a recommendation that he be 
screened and considered for drug treatment at the earliest point in 
time, while in prison as a condition of parole. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of March 17, 1994, KACSUTA was at home in his 
apartment, visiting with his brother and friends, watching 
television. KACSUTA received an unannounced visit from his 
probation officer, RODNEY SEYMOUR. Trial Transcript at 70. At 
4 
that time, KACSUTA was under the supervision of Adult Probation and 
Parole and was a week late in reporting to his probation officer 
for the month of March. Id at 70* Those present in KACSUTA's 
apartment that evening were, his brother, JASON KACSUTA, and some 
friends, CODY R. BEAUMONT, JACKIE ERWIG, SHAWN HUTCHINGS, LESLIE 
ABNER, and MATT MANDERA, one ors more of whom was under the age of 
eighteen years. Id at 122. JASON GREENWOOD, JERRY PEREZ, and 
SCOTT CLEMMONS, were not present in KACSUTA's apartment that 
evening, but were called as witnesses at trial. 
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KACSUTA was conducted into the hall and his probation officer 
performed a pat down search Of his person• Id at 71• The officer 
found three baggies of marijuana, id at 72, in various quantities, 
respectively, 5.2 grams, 2.8 grams and 0.4 grams, id at 86, 
together identified as State's Exhibit 1 at trial. KACSUTA was 
arrested and taken to the Beaver County Sheriff's Office. Id at 
72. 
Sometime thereafter, KACSUTA's apartment was searched by 
officers RUSSELL L, ERICKSON and CAMERON NOEL, and there was found 
a pocket knife, parts of a disassembled pipe, namely the bowl and 
screen, a clip, scales, and marijuana stem and seeds. Id at 96 and 
111. These officers further investigation disclosed that the 
scales belonged to MATT MANDERA. Id at 103 and 113. 
KACSUTA was charged with Count I, POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a Second Degree Felony, and 
Count II, POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Class A 
Misdemeanor. KACSUTA was never charged with POSSESSION OF DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA. 
KACSUTA was appointed the public defender to represent him at 
trial, and a preliminary hearing was held on the 19th day of April, 
1994# whereat, KACSUTA was bound over for jury tjrjlal on both 
counts. On the 17th day of June, 1994, KACSUTA, by and through his 
appointed counsel, moved to suppress evidence from his arrest and 
search of his apartment. This included a motion to suppress 
testimony of prior bad character, in particular evidence of any 
sale or delivery of controlled substances by KACSUTA to SCOTT 
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CLEMMONS, or any other person prior to March 17, 1994* The motion 
was denied and the matter went to trial on the 22nd day of June, 
1994. 
At trial, KACSUTA's probation officer was called who testified 
of the circumstances incident to his arrest of KACSUTA and 
testified that he found three baggies and Fifty-Eight ($58.00) 
Dollars in cash on KACSUTA's person. The cash made the Probation 
Officer suspicious because he believed that KACSUTA was unemployed. 
Id at 68. 
A criminologist was called who testified of his testing of the 
three baggies of substance marked at State's Exhibit 1 and 
testified that the same was marijuana. Id at 85. There was no 
evidence presented that the criminologist had tested or even 
examined the items seized during the police officer search of 
KACSUTA's apartment. Said police officer's, ERlCKSON and NOEL, of 
the Beaver City Police Department, testified of their search of 
KACSUTA's apartment and seizure of certain items and further 
rendered unqualified opinions claiming that the blade of the pocket 
knife and the bowl of the pipe contained marijuana residue. Id at 
100. On cross examination Defense Counsel asked each officer if 
MATT MANDERA had told them that he owned the scales found in 
KACSUTA's apartment. The officers stated that he had, but said 
testimony was stricken upo#]ih#|fSfcM&!ft£ Objection on the grounds of 
heresy. Id at 103 and UIHHIIIHHI^^ a witness* The 
items seized from K A C S U M l M ^ into evidence 
without objection from Defense Coiiitfeell 
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T?he State called there witnesses who testified regarding 
KACSUTA's bad character and/or previous dealings involving the use 
of marijuana. CODY BEAUMONT who was under the age of eighteen and 
present in KACSUTA's apartment on the evening of KACSUTA's arrest, 
testified that he was not aware that KACSUTA had marijuana on his 
person that evening, but that on an earlier occasion, some two to 
three weeks prior, he had smoked some marijuana with KACSUTA in his 
pickup truck. Id at 124 and 125. JERRY PEREZ testified that he 
was not present on the evening of KACSUTA1's arrest, but on an 
earlier occasion, some two to three weeks prior, had smoked 
marijuana with KACSUTA at PEREZ'S apartment. Id at 129* SCOTT 
CLEMMONS testified that he was not present on the evening of 
KACSUTA's arrest, but that on an earlier occasion, some two to 
three weeks prior, he had purchased a small quantity of marijuana 
from KACSUTA. Id at 132. 
The testimony of these witnesses was argued in some detail and 
the Court allowed the testimony as an exception to Rule 404(b) and 
only with a cautionary instruction. Said cautionary instruction 
was given by the Court verbally to the jury at the time of 
BEAUMONT'S testimony• There was never any written instruction 
given to the jury and was not repeated orally at the time of either 
PEREZ'S or CLEMMONS's testimony. Said cautionary instruction was 
confusing, misleading, un#M^^Mdyill<i#quate 
1
 Verbal C a u t J L M i ™ ^ given by t h e Court i s 
found a t T r i a l Tra^iii||elliill•l•HnHlnlilliIlii^p reads as fo l l ows : 
THE COURTS A l r i g h t . L M I & r ^ you a r e going t o be 
r e c e i v i n g some informat ion dur ing t h i s t r i a l 
r e l a t i n g t o p r i o r i a c t s of d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
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controlled substance by the Defendant. You are 
instructed that information is only relevant and is 
only being admitted, in this case, on the issue of 
the Defendant's intent with regard to the marijuana 
that was found in his pocket as testified to by Mr. 
Seymour on March 17, 1994. You're not to use that 
information or consider that evidence in regard to 
any other aspect of the case. You may not find the 
Defendant, JARED KACSUTA, guilty of the offense 
charged in this case, based solely on the evidence 
that he may had distributed marijuana in the past. 
The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the Defendant intended to distribute the marijuana 
he possessed, if any, on March 17, 1994. Evidence 
indicating that he engaged in such conduct on some 
other occasion may be considered by you as evidence 
of his intent on March 17, 1994; However, you may 
not enter a guilty verdict in this case if the 
State fails to prove the elements of the offense or 
offenses charged, even if you believe that he may 
have committed a similar crime in the past. 
KACSUTA called no witnesses in his defense and chose not to 
testify himself. He was found guilty on Count I, POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a Second Degree 
Felony, on the 19th day of July, 1994, KACSUTA moved for reduction 
of judgment of conviction and the same was denied by the Court. 
KACSUTA was sentenced to incarceration at the Utah State Prison 
with no fine imposed and a recommendation that he be screened and 
considered for drug treatment at the earliest point in time while 
in,prison as a condition of parole. 
KACSUTA initiated his, own appeal, asserting ineffective 
assistance of counsel and requested that the Court appoint him 
successor counsel for purposes of the appeal. The attorney filing 
this appeal was the attorney appointed by the Court at KACSUTA's 
request and did not represent KACSUTA at trial. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENTS 
Irk o 
DEFENDANT'S REPRESENTATION AT TRIAL WAS INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, WHERE COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION FELL 
BELOW AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS 
RESULTING IN PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT. 
The Standard regarding ineffective assistance of counsel is 
established in Stricklin v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). Therein, the United States Supreme Court 
stated that to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, Defendant must show, first, that counsel rendered a 
deficient performance that fell below the objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment and, second, that counsel's 
deficient performance prejudiced the Defendant. Stricklin, 466 
U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. 
In showing that counsel rendered Defendant deficient 
performance, the burden is on the Defendant to demonstrate that 
counsel's representation fell below an objection standard of 
reasonableness. Stricklin, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. 
In Salt Lake City v. Grotepas, 238 Utah Advanced Report 13 (Utah 
App. 1994), the Utah Coturtu, o£hlAntb«»i»ls further qualified the 
ineffective assistance o f M u i i M M t t s . f ,0 1. ,,s: 
Ordinarily, still 
counsel] may only m 
:fective assistance of 
collateral attack in 
Habeas Corpus proceediA^ B^SIiJlH,,S&,,,, the trial record is 
insufficient to allow.the Claim to be determined on direct 
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appeal. (Citations omitted). However, if the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, is first raised on direct appeal 
and Defendant's appellant counsel was not also trial counsel, 
as in the case before us, w& may consider the issue only if 
the record is adequate to permit a decision. If we address 
the claim based on the record we must decide whether Defendant 
was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a 
matter of law. Nevertheless, out review of trial "counsel's" 
performance must be highly differential; otherwise, the 
"distorting effects of hindsight" would lead us to engage in 
second guessing. Id at 14. See also State v. Garrett, 849 
P.2d 578 (Utah App), cert denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993); 
see also, State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1993). 
In the instant case, KACSUTA was appointed counsel at trial, 
initiated his own appeal and requested the appointment of successor 
counsel for appeal purposes and was appointed successor counsel for 
that purpose. 
While bound by the trial record, KACSUTA asserts that there 
are factors indicating that his representation at trial fell below 
the objective standard of reasonableness and created a reasonable 
probability that the jury verdict would have been more favorable if 
he had had more effective representation. 
POINT NO. 1 
AT TRIAL, DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO SPECIFICALLY OBJECT TO THE 
INTRODUCTION OF PARAPHERNALIA SEIZED IN KACSUTA'S APARTMENT. 
After the Defendant was arrested and taken into custody, his 
apartment was searched by Beaver City Police Officers RUSSELL L. 
ERICKSON and CAMERON NOEL. Said officers seized a pocket knife, 
parts of a disassembled pipe, namely the bowl and screen, a clip, 
scales, and marijuana steraf and j^feedg* Defense Counsel did move to 
suppress the evidence as a wa^tana|iy^|^ illegal search, which was 
not incident to arrest. Howfe^W^VIFTfUl, Defense Counsel failed 
to object to the items admissibility on grounds not raised in the 
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motion to suppress• Namely, counsel could have objected to 
relevancy, because KACSUTA had never been charged with possession 
of drug paraphernalia. Second, the Defense Counsel could have 
objected to foundation, since ownership of the items was never 
clearly established and ownership was at issue on at least one of 
the items where testimony suggested that the scales belonged to 
MATT HANDERA. Third, Defense Counsel could have objected to the 
representations made by the officers that the pocket knife and pipe 
bowl contained marijuana residue, where there was no testimony 
given by the State's criminologist suggesting that said items had 
ever been examined or tested. 
POINT NOo 2 
DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO CALL MATT MANDERA IN DEFENSE'S CASE. 
KACSUTA asserts that the paraphernalia found in his apartment 
and allowed to be introduced into evidence without objection was a 
very damaging oversight. Of those items seized and introduced as 
evidence, the weighing scales were by far the most damaging 
regarding the charge of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH 
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a Second Degree Felony. The record indicated 
that through the testimony of the officers, ERICKSON and NOEL, see 
trial transcript at pages 103 and 113, that MATT MANDERA, stated 
that he owned the scales. The state objected to this testimony as 
heresy and the same was stt£ta£ttdd \Pt fP^P Court. Defense Counsel 
would have avoided the JUIUnHHI(fe*<l h e c a l l e d MANDERA to 
testify at trial. 
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Similarly, Defense Counsel should have argued the applicable 
heresy exceptions. Rule 803(15)(Statements effecting interests in 
property) and (24)(Other Exceptions, Statements offered as evidence 
of material facts, more probative than other evidence which could 
be produced through reasonable efforts and justice is best served 
by their admission). MANDERA was not called as a witness and no 
exception was taken to the ruling on the State's objection and the 
scales were submitted into evidence under an assumption that they 
belonged to KACSUTA. 
POINT NO. 3 
DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO CHALLENGE THE STATE'S CLAIM 
OF MARIJUANA RESIDUE ON THE POCKET KNIFE AND IN THE PIPE BOWL. 
As set forth above, no objection was made to the introduction 
of paraphernalia found in KACSUTA's apartment. At trial, the State 
simply had the Beaver City Police Officer's testify that the pocket 
knife and pipe bowl had marijuana residue on them. The State had 
called a criminologist who had tested the substance found on 
KACSUTA's person but did not testify of any testing of the residue 
claimed to have been found on the knife and pipe bowl. The 
Defendant was not charged with possession of drug paraphernalia and 
so the objection to relevancy spewed,,apprppriate. However, there 
was clearly, a challenge ^ s to the officers' unqualified statements 
that these items contained marijuana residue. While Defense 
Counsel had made a motion to suppress this evidence as having been 
seized due to an illegal search, there was no specific objection 
made at trial to the items' introduction on these or any other 
grounds. 
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POINT NO, 4 
DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO REQUEST THAT THE CAUTIONARY 
INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE COURT REGARDING KACSUTA'S PRIOR BAD 
CHARACTER BE GIVEN ALSO AS A WRITTEN INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY. 
As part of the State's case in chief, and for the purpose of 
establishing KACSUTA's intent to distribute, the State introduced 
character testimony of Defendant's prior dealings. This consisted 
of the testimony of CODY BEAUMONT, JERRY PEREZ and SCOTT CLEMMONS. 
CODY BEAUMONT testified that he didn't know the Defendant had 
marijuana in his possession on the night of the arrest, but 
testified that on a prior occasion, while chumming around with the 
Defendant, he has smoked some marijuana with him. 
JERRY PEREZ testified that prior to March 17, 1994, he had 
smoked some marijuana with MATT MANDERA and the Defendant* 
SCOTT CLEMMONS testified that on an earlier occasion he had 
purchased a small amount of marijuana from the Defendant on one 
occasion. 
Defense counsel had moved to limit the testimony under Rule 
404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, as inadmissible to prove character 
of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. 
The trial court denied*the motion to supprqs^.asserting that 
the testimony was relevant and that under Rule 4Q3, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, the probative vqlue substantially outweighed the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The Court's 
determination regarding this issufe will be hereafter discussed, 
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however, the Court did give an oral cautionary instruction to the 
jury, see trial transcript, page 123, during the testimony of CODY 
BEAUMONT. There was no written instruction given even though the 
Court indicated that it would give such an instruction* Trial 
Transcript at page 57. Defense Counsel should have insisted that 
the cautionary instruction be, clearer as to which testimony it 
would apply to, more complete and definitive as to how the evidence 
should be treated by the jury and providing that the distribution 
of marijuana in the past does not indicate that any possession of 
marijuana in the future will be with the intent to distribute, that 
the jury be advised at the same time that the Defendant has a 
presumption of innocence and that the instruction be more 
definitive and less ambiguous as to what the Court meant by the 
testimony going to the intent of the Defendant. 
POINT NO. 5 
DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO REQUEST A MORE DEFINITIVE INSTRUCTION 
ON THE ISSUE OF INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE. 
The issue of distinction between the two Counts charged 
against KACSUTA, POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE and 
POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA, was the issue of intent to distribute. 
The only instruction given at trial was the general definition of 
intent. There was no instruction regarding intent to distribute. 
Defense Counsel should have requested that such an instruction be 
given, particularly in light of the Court's ruling regarding the 
admissibility of prior bad character testimony. Without said 
instruction, the cautionary instruction given by the Court becomes 
misleading since the jury is not adequately instructed with regard 
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to the issue of intent to distribute, the general intent language, 
which was given tends to be misleading as to what the Court meant 
by its particular use of the terra* The intent to possess is not 
the same as the intent to distribute and this distinction should 
have been more clearly defined and explained to the jury. Defense 
Counsel did not offer such an instruction and none was given by the 
Court. 
POINT NO. 6 
DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO CALL WITNESSES OR INTRODUCE 
EVIDENCE AS TO KACSUTA'S EMPLOYMENT. 
Where the State of Utah had made it a critical issue of the 
case that Mr. KACSUTA had Fifty-Eight ($58.00) Dollars on his 
person and was believed to be unemployed. Defense Counsel should 
have called a witness or introduced evidence to verify KACSUTA's 
employment. Since KACSUTA did not testify at trial, the State's 
unsubstantiated testimony went unrebutted. Defense Counsel could 
have called KACSUTA's employer or a work associate or KACSUTA 
himself to testify of his employment circumstances at4 the time of 
his arrest on March 17, 1994. Although the jury was never 
correctly informed as to KACSUTA's^employment circumstances, the 
record seems to indicate that KACstJTA Was employed at the time of 
his arrest. See Trial Transcript at 47. 
POINT NO. 7 
DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO C^LL AS WITNESSES THOSE PRESENT 
IN KACSUTA'S APARTMENT AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST. 
As indicated above, KACSUTA1 did not testify at trial. Whether 
this was a trial strategy known to counsel prior to trial is 
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unknown. However, what seemed clear and apparent prior to trial 
was that the State would attempt to establish KACSUTA's intent to 
distribute by inferences of bad character, prior criminal activity, 
characterization of items seized from KACSUTA's apartment, and the 
surrounding circumstances of the arrest. It is likely that Defense 
Counsel knew before hand the witnesses that the State intended to 
call at trial since a request for discovery or bill of particulars 
had been made on the State. However, at the time of the arrest, 
KACSUTA was with his brother and several friends, only one of which 
was called to testify. There seems to be no satisfactory 
explanation as to why Defense Counsel did not call KACSUTA's 
brother and those others present in KACSUTA's apartment at the time 
of his arrest for the "sole purpose of rebutting those inferences 
that the State was attempting to use to show intent to distribute. 
The one witness that was called, CODY BEAUMONT, did in fact testify 
that he did not know that KACSUTA had marijuana on his person at 
the time of his arrest. If the testimony of KACSUTA's brother and 
the others present was consistent with the testimony of BEAUMONT, 
it would have gone a long way to rebutting the inferences drawn by 
the State regarding the key issue of intent to distribute. 
POINT NO. 8 
DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO REQUEST THE LESSER INCLUDED INSTRUCTION 
ON THE OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE. 
Since there was little or no defense asserted in the case, the 
State's case in chief went uncontroverted as far as the evidence 
was concerned. That evidence established that KACSUTA had three 
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baggies of marijuana and Fifty-Eight ($58.00) Dollars in cash on 
his person; that he was unemployed at the time of his arrest; that 
he had various items of drug paraphernalia in his apartment; that 
he had on previous occasions smoked marijuana with others and on 
one occasion sold a small quantity of marijuana to another; and, 
that one or more of the individuals in KACSUTA's room on the night 
of his arrest was under the age of eighteen years. However, no 
testimony or evidence was presented that on the evening of March 
17, 1994, that marijuana was distributed or even known about by 
others in KACSUTA's apartment. There was no evidence of any 
discussion regarding marijuana or the distribution thereof that 
evening. The evidence supporting the jury's finding of intent to 
distribute is based solely upon inferences drawn from the 
surrounding circumstances, uncorroborated by any testimony or 
statement. The fact that KACSUTA was charged with POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE as well as POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, strongly suggests a defense in 
having the lesser included offense of ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, included as a 
lesser included instruction for the jury's consideration. Defense 
Counsel did not do so. It is not clear in the record whether such 
consideration was in fact decided upon &s part of Defense's trial 
strategy. 
B*. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT KACSUTA'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS, IN PARTICULAR, WITH REGARD TO TESTIMONY OF 
KACSUTArS BAD CHARACTER, WHERE SUCH WAS REMOTE, CONFUSED 
THE ISSUES, MISLEAD THE JURY AND/OR WAS CUMULATIVE. 
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Rule 404(b), Utah Rule of Evidence addresses and provides 
certain limitations on character evidence. Therein it states: 
(b) Other Crimes, Wrong or Acts, Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs or acts are not 
admissible to prove the character of a person 
in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
It has generally been the policy not to allow the State to 
discredit the character of a Defendant where the Defendant does not 
call character witnesses in his behalf as a defense. In other 
words, it is rarely the practice to allow the State to introduce as 
part of their case in chief, bad character testimony. 
Since in the instant case, KACSUTA did not testify and no 
witnesses were called by Defense Counsel in KACSUTA's behalf, 
neither KACSUTA's knowledge nor intent were at issue. Compare 
State v. Brown, 577 P.2 135 (Utah 1978), where evidence of alleged 
prior unrelated offense involving similar criminal activity by 
Defendant was properly admitted as evidence of Defendant's 
knowledge and intent, where Defendant had testified that he was 
innocently involved in the criifiina^  .actions of his son and directly 
put at issue his own knpwledge. ^ nc| intent. Compare also State v. 
McLane, 706 P. 2 603 (Utah(19p5>, where the Utah Supreme Court found 
that the trial court did not abuse it's discretion in permitting 
evidence to be presented to the jury of nine returned checks which 
were not at issue, such the admission of the checks was for the 
purpose of attacking the credibility of both the Defendant and her 
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father as witnesses and to show knowledge, intent or absence of 
mistake in a prosecution for issuing bad checks. 
The Utah Supreme Court has upheld the use of a cautionary 
instruction when such evidence is admitted. See State v, Smith. 
700 p.2 1106 (Utah 1985). However, it has not been addressed in 
what form the cautionary instruction should be given, whether 
verbal or written, as with other jury instructions, or at what 
stage in trial proceeding such instruction should be given, or the 
extent and scope of such cautionary instruction. All of these are 
at issue in the present case. 
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of 
allowing specific instances of misconduct as evidence to prove a 
character trait. In State v. Minnish, 560 P,2 340 (Utah 1977), the 
Court found that evidence of conduct in specific instances is not 
admissible to prove a character trait, except in the case of prior 
criminal convictions. Consequently, the introduction of evidence 
regarding criminal activity for which KACSUTA had never been 
charged, arrested or questioned, not only was inadmissible under 
Minnish but completely changed the posturing of KACSUTA's defense. 
KACSUTA was now faced with having to dispute allegations regarding 
charges that were never brought against him. He was now forced to 
encompass in his defense explanations and justification for 
activity remote from the activity for which he had been charged, 
arrested and ultimately convicted. The problems went far beyond 
simply having a some prejudicial impact upon the jury's 
deliberations. It effectively robbed the Defendant of his 
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constitutional rights of presumption of innocence, substantive due 
process and equal protection* The Defendant was literally forced 
to defend himself against phantom charges and crimes and make that 
a part of his defense strategy to defend against the two charges 
filed against him. 
Defense Counsel had moved to suppress the evidence. First, it 
attempted to Suppress the evidence generated from the search and 
arrest of the KACSUTA, this consisted of three baggies of marijuana 
and Fifty-Eight ($58.00) Dollars in cash. Defense Counsel asserted 
the probation officer had no reasonable suspicion at the time of 
the search and therefore the search was illegal and/or improper. 
Defense Counsel's motion clearly attempts to suppress the 
testimony of SCOTT CLEMMONS and those other witnesses. However, 
the evidence was allowed to be admitted and the inference was draw 
that KACSUTA intended to distribute on March 17, 1994, without 
corroborating evidence. Defense Counsel objected to its 
admissibility on the grounds set forth in Rule 404(b), Utah Rule of 
Evidence, the Court allowed the testimony in under Rule 403. 
Although the trial Court took into consideration the basic 
principal of whether, tl*e07|);robative value of the testimony 
substantially outweighed the danger of prejudice, it seems to have 
misapplied the rule with regard to whether the information would 
confuse the issues, mislead the jury or constitute a needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
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POINT NO. 1 
BY ALLOWING THE TESTIMONY OF PRIOR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, THE COURT 
CREATED A BREEDING GROUND FOR CONFUSION OF THE ISSUE OF INTENT. 
Through cautionary instruction, the Court informed the jury 
that testimony of BEAUMONT, PEREZ and CLEMMONS, was only relevant 
to issue of intent and should only be considered for that purpose. 
However, there was no written cautionary instruction delivered to 
the jury for deliberation. The instruction was given orally at the 
time of BEAUMONT'S testimony and was unqualified, ambiguous, 
unclear and incomplete. There was no further instruction given as 
to intent to distribute. There was no admonition given that 
KACSUTA was presumed innocent until proven guilty of any prior 
criminal activity that came to light by reason of the testimony. 
There was no explanation given to the jury as to which testimony or 
evidence should come under the cautionary instruction. 
POINT NO. 2 
WITH THE INCOMPLETE AND INADEQUATE CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION, THE 
TESTIMONY AT TRIAL HAD A HIGH PROBABILITY OF MISLEADING THE JURY 
TO BELIEVE THAT THE PRIOR CRIMINAL WAS RELATED TO THE EVENTS 
OF KACSUTA'S ARREST BEYOND THE ISSUE OF INTENT. 
By issuing the cautionary instruction, the Court was aware of 
the high probability of prejudicing KACSUTA by allowing such 
testimony. However9 the fact that the instruction was given only 
verbally and did not qualify itself as to which testimony it 
applied to and the fact that it was given only before BEAUMONT'S 
testimony and not during the testimony of either PEREZ or CLEMMONS, 
there was a strong likelihood and high probability that the jury 
had insufficient information upon which to correctly apply the 
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cautionary instruction. In short, if the jury did not fully 
understand and comprehend the scope and extent of the cautionary 
instruction, they were misled. 
POINT NO. 3 
THE TESTIMONY REGARDING KACSUTA'S PRIOR ACTIVITIES WAS REMOTE. 
HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO FURTHER INSTRUCTION GIVEN AS TO THE 
WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Generally, remoteness is a factor that goes to the weight of 
the evidence and not to it's admissibility. In this case, the 
testimony was deemed admissible even though it was very remote. 
However, the jury was not instructed as to how remoteness in 
considering what weight and sufficiency they should give under the 
circumstances of this incident. If the jury was not instructed 
that remote evidence should be given less weight than other 
relevant evidence, then there is a substantial likelihood that the 
jury would be confused or mislead by simply given such testimony 
and cautioning them only to consider it for purposes of intent. By 
issuing the cautionary instruction the Court instructed the jury to 
giv& the testimony full consideration as evidence of intent. 
POINT NO. 4 
THE STATE OF UTAH HAD OTHER MEANS AT IT'S DISPOSAL FOR 
ESTABLISHING INTENT AND THE EVIDENCE ALLOWED TO BE ADMITTED 
BY THE COURT WAS IN FACT CUMULATIVE AND REFERRED TO 
SPECIFIC CRIMINAL,ACTS. 
It was clear to the Court that the testimony that was to be 
presented by the State from BEAUMONT, PEREZ and CLEMMONS was 
character testimony and referred to specific acts of criminal 
activity for which KACSUTA had never been charged with or convicted 
of. In considering its probative value, the Court took the 
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position that because there were three witnesses, instead of one, 
that somehow made the evidence more probative. However, the Rule 
seems to make clear that if the evidence is cumulative then it 
should not be admitted. In other words, if the State of Utah, had 
other means of establishing intent, which they had in this case, 
then the evidence should not have been admitted. The testimony of 
PEREZ and CLEMMONS was absolutely unnecessary since neither person 
was present with KACSUTA on the evening of his arrest and the 
activities regarding which they testified were two to three weeks 
prior to March 17, 1994. In addition, the Stat>e had other evidence 
regarding the issue of intent. That evidence of three baggies o£ 
marijuana found on the Defendant's person, the paraphernalia found 
in KACSUTA's apartment and the witnesses which were present in 
KACSUTA's apartment on the evening of his arrest. The State also 
had expert testimony of criminologist, a drug inspector, a 
probation officer, and two investigating officers from Beaver City 
Police Department. There was simply no need to allow4the testimony 
regarding prior criminal acts for which KACSUTA was never charged, 
arrested or convicted. 
The Court inquired as to the State's ability to prove intent 
by sources other than these witnesses and the State advised the 
Court that they did have other means establishing such testimony. 
However, the Court allowed the testimony and attempted to minimize 
its prejudicial impact by issuing an inadequate cautionary 
instruction. 
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c. 
THERE HAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT ON 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, 
A SECOND DEGREE FELONY. 
In the instant case, the evidence was insufficient to convict 
on the charge of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent 
to Distribute, because there was no reliable evidence given 
regarding intent. It was uncontroverted that CODY BEAUMONT, who 
was the only person who was present the evening of Defendant's 
arrest who testified at trial, was unaware that Defendant has 
marijuana on his person that evening. MATT MANDERA later told 
investigating officers that he owned the scales which were found in 
the Defendant's apartment. The three baggies found in Defendant's 
possession were in very small quantities, consistent with personal 
use. The amounts were not evenly divided. The prior activity 
involving BEAUMONT, PEREZ and CLEMMONS, regarded criminal activity 
for which the Defendant had never been charged or arrested and had 
occurred two to three weeks prior to Defendant's arrest on March 
17, 1994. The arresting officers had not reasonable suspicion to 
search the Defendant. The officers who conducted the search of 
Defendant's apartment had no search warrant and the search was not 
made incident to arrest. 
D. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT REDUCING JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AT 
THE TIME OP SENTENCING. 
On July 19, 1994, KACSUTA was sentenced on a Second Degree 
Felony, POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE. There was no evidence of actual distribution. There 
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was no testimony that anyone was actually aware that KACSUTA had 
marijuana on his person* At least one person with KACSUTA that 
evening was under the age o£ eighteen years. The critical item of 
paraphernalia, the scales, appears to have been owned by somebody 
else* 
Because of the lack of evidence as to what took place on the 
evening of March 17, 1994/ it seems clear that the jury drew the 
inferences argued by the State to infer criminal intent to 
distribute from the circumstances involving prior instances of 
criminal activity, the jury did not consider a lesser included 
charge of ATTEMPTED DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, even 
though the facts and circumstances seem to more appropriately fit 
within that level of offense* The Court essentially was given the 
opportunity to consider a lesser included offense at the time of 
sentencing and declined to do so by denying KACSUTA's Motion to 
RedUde. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant/Appellant moves for 
dismissal of the action or in the alternative remand for retrial, 
together with such other and further relief as to this Court 
appears equitable and proper• 
DATED this <7 ^ (^-day of Cn 19 *f* . 
w^KSON ^ 
for Defendant/Appellant 
26 
ADDENDUM 
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John 0. Christiansen 
Attorney for Defendant 
P. 0. Box 1468 
Beaver, Utah 84713 
Tel. 801-438-5412 
THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UT 
STATE OF UTAH, ) MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF 
Plaintiff, ) JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION--
vs. ) NOTICE OF HEARING--
JARED CHRISTOPHER KACSUTA, ) CERYIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Defendant ) No. 94-CR-36 
MOTION 
Defendant, by and through her counsel of record, hereby mov 
the court for an order reducing the judgment of conviction of 
Defendant entered in the above-entitled action from a felony of 
the second degree to a felony of the third degree pursuant to 
the provisions of Utah Code Section 76-3-402. 
This motion is based on the records and files in this actio 
and upon whatever evidence and/or argument that may be presented 
at the hearing and the evidence presented at the trial. 
Dated July 19, 1994. 
John 0. Christiansen 
Attorney for Defendant 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO LEO G. KANELL, BEAVER COUNTY ATTORNEY, ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
Please take notice that Defendant will clal up the foregoin 
MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION for hearing and 
disposition on the 19th day of July, 1994, at the hour of 10:00 
o'clock A.M., or as soon thereafter as judgment is entered and 
sentence pronounced, at the Courtroom in the Beaver County Court 
105 East Center Street, Beaver City, Utah. 
John 0. Christiansen 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Motion and Not 
on Plaintiff by delivering a copy thereof to Leo G. Kanell, Bea\ 
County Attorney, at his office in the Beaver County Courthouse, 
on the 19th day of July, 1994. 
John 0. Christiansen, 
Attorney for Defendant 
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John 0. Christiansen 
Attorney for Defendant 
P. 0. Box 1468 
Beaver, Utah 84713 
Tel. 438-5412 or 438-$002 
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THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTA 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
JARED CHRISTOPHER KACSUTA, 
Defendant 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRES 
No. 94-CR-36 
Defendant hereby presents his memorandum in support of his 
Motion to Suppress dated June<l4, 1994. 
FACTS 
Defendant assumes that the facts which will be developed at 
the hearing on the Motion to Suppress will be substantially the s 
as presented at the preliminary examination, and the legal analys 
herein is based on that assumption. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
I. 
This portion "I" of the analysis is directed to paragraph !f 
of the Motion to Suppress, th&t is, suppressing of all evidence 
generated from the arrest and search of Defendant on March 17, 1( 
at or near Apartment 5 of the apartment building located at 25 
West 100 North Street in Beaver City, Utah. 
1. Defendant was on parole from the Utah State Prison and \ 
being supervised by Agent Rod Seymour of the Utah Department of 
Adult Probation and Parole. Defendant had executed a Parole 
Agreement, copy attached marked MBxhibit A". Defendant was oblij 
to file a report with his supervising agent by not later than th< 
10th day of each month, but he had not done so by March 17 for 
that month. Agents Seymour and Eckman went to Defendant's apart 
ment above mentioned on the evening of March 17, 1994, to check 
into the lack of reporting for that month. They were admitted t 
the apartment by Defendant and Agent Seymour viewed the livingr 
area and saw five or sig other persons therein playing games, bu 
the agents did not notice any indication of the presence or use 
marijuana or other illegal drugs. 
2. Agent Seymour requested Defendant to step into the 
hallway which Defendant did. Then the agent proceeded to search 
Defendant by patting and a shake down for the agent's stated rea 
of self-protection and because Defendant had failed to file a 
report. The search located cash in an approximate amount of 
$58.00 and three small plastic bags in the left front pocket of 
Defendant's trousers. The, agent felt on the outside that someth 
was in the left front pocket and he then withdrew the bags. No 
weapons were found. The agent carefully examined the bags and f 
in each a small quantity of what he identified to be marijuana. 
After that examination, Agent Seymour placed defendant under 
arrest for failure to report on his parole and for possession of 
marijuana. No statement of an intention, cause or authority to 
made to Defendant until after the search was completed and the 
supposed marijuana identified. 
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3. The citizen's right to be free from unreasonable search* 
and seizures is secured by the Amendment IV of the United States 
Constitution and Article t, Section 14, of the Constitution of UJ 
For a search to be lawful, the State must justify it by some 
affirmative purposfe and manner that relax the constitutional 
prohibitions. 
4. Paragraph "5" of the Parole Agreement granted author it 
search Defendant upoh reasonaoie suspicion to insure compliance 
with the conditions of the-parole. The only violation of the pa 
conditions of which the agent had any suspicion was the failure 
to report, (and that might not have become to the level of "reas 
able suspicion" since the teport was not long overdue), but ther 
was no basis for a suspicion as to the possession or use of ille 
drugs at thd time that the search was commenced. It does not 
appear that a search would be necessary or appropriate because o 
a failure to report. If a search for weapons was permissible, 
a withdrawal of the three small flexible plastic bags from the 
inside of defendant's Docket was not lustified as a feeling of t 
through the trouser material on tne outside would not have given 
a reasonable impression that there was a firearm, knife or other 
weapon inside the pocket. The search went beyond what was permi 
and the search for and the seizure of the marijuana were illegal 
and should be suppressed. 
Even if an arrest for failure to report was justified, the 
search cannot be justified &s being incident to an arrest. 
(a) Section 77-7-1, Utah Code, states in pertinent part: 
"An arrest is the actual restraint of the person arrested or 
submission to custody." ... There was neither restraint nor 
submission to custody until the arrest was announced and after 
the search and seizure were completed. Prior to that time, Defen 
was only acting on'the request of the agent. 
(b) Section 77-7-6, Utah Code, states in pertinent part: 
"The person making'the arrest shall Inform the person being arres 
of his intention, cAnse and authority to arrest him." ... Again, 
none of these requirements,was done .until after the search and th 
seizure of the mariluana were completed. It is significant the 
the officer stated the cause and basis for the arrest to be for 
failure to report and for possession of marijuana, indicating th* 
the illegal search formed h jJart of the basis for the arrest.Foi 
search to have been incident to the arrest, it would had to hav< 
been performed following the arrest or, at most, during the arrej 
but it could not have been prior to the arrest* 
II. 
This portion ,fIIff analyzes paragraph ?f2M of the Motion to 
Suppress, that is, that all evidence generated from the search oi 
Defendant's apartment should be suppressed. The sole and exclu1 
basis for the search of the apartment was the report that Agent 
Seymour gave to the personnel at the County Jail that he had 
seized supposed marijuana from the person of defendant at the 
apartment and his 'Suggest ion It hat a search of the apartment be 
conducted. That rMort jwasi sin insufficient and illegal basis fo 
the search for the) ioiiowih£ treasons: 
1. The search of Defendant and the seizure of the marijuan 
from his person was illegal and all police action based thereon 
was f,fruit from the poisonous tree" and was burdened with the 
- A -
same taint as that search. (See section "I11 of this memorandum.) 
J 
This rule is explained in the Utah Supreme Court case of State vs 
Thurman, 846 P2d 1256, particularly section H7" commencing on Paj 
1262, copy attached as "Exhibit Blf. As stated in Thurman, the re 
for the rule is to deter future Improper police action* Although 
the subsequent consent search of the storage unit was sustained j 
the Thurman case despite the illegal entry into and search of th( 
apartment, the application of the rule would surely suppress the 
search of the apartment under the facts in this Kacsuta case. Tl 
were no intervening facts in this case to give additional supporl 
to a basis for the apartment search. It is significant that the 
officers who went to the apartment to arrest Jason Kaesuta betwe< 
the time of the arrest or aerenaant and the search of the apartm< 
found no indication of1the presence of marijuana in the apartmem 
To allow evidence gathered from a search of the apartment woul$ 
tend to lure police officers 'into a false security that the basi" 
for the search is not important because the search will be 
sustained regardless* The'fact,that the search was with the 
consent of Defendant doesjnot cure the defect under the Thurman 
rule and similar authorities. 
2. The report of Agent Seymour that he had seized marijuai 
from the person of Defendant at! the apartment did not constitute 
probable cause for the search of the apartment. Had'the police 
personnel submitted the facts,to a magistrate for a determinatio 
of whether or not probable cause existed for the issuance of a 
search warrant, the Question could have been judicially decided 
and the present dispute cbuld have been avoided. If the magistr 
had ruled that there4was not probable'cause, perhaps further 
investigation could have been made resulting in sufficient addit 
supportive evidence being collected. 
III. 
This pottion of this memorandum analyzes paragraph "3" of t 
Motion to Suppress, that is, suppressing evidence of purchases 
from Defendant of marijuana prior to March 17, 1994, the date of 
the arrest. At the preliminary examination, one Scott Clemons 
testified that he had purchased a small quantity of tnarijuana fr 
Defendant two or three weeks prior to March 17, 1994. 
me general ruie tnat. evidence or ox^ ner crimes is noD 
admissible in a criminal action is set forth in American Juris-
prudence 2d, V. 294 Evidence Sec. 320, copy attached marked "Bxh 
C". The reason for the rule is that such evidence is prejudicia 
against Defendant in that it may misdirect the attention of the 
to a consideration!or tne otner crimes ratner tnan on tne crime 
being tried, and thejury mayfreceive the impression that the 
accused is an habitual criminal and should be punished whether o 
not he is guilty of the icrlm^  being ttied. There are exceptions 
whether the evidence has sufficient Drobative value to iustifv t 
prejudicial effect that it will have,|bearing in mind the defend 
presumption of innocence. In the instant case, the sale by Defe 
of such a small quantity, two or three weeks before does not have 
any significant probative value as evidence of Defendants inter 
as to his intended disposition of the small auantltv that he hac 
in his Docket at the time of the search. The time lanse betwec 
the supposed sale to Clemons and the time of the search was too 
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lorfS ^  provide a carry over of intent from the time of th* 
an(j the time of the sekrch. The weakness of the testimony 
Qr other similar witness, however, might not be accurately 
by the jury and the result would be unduly prejudicial aga 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Supp 
sh0uld be granted In total, • 
Dated June 17, 1994. 
John 0. Christiansen, 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF, SERVICE 
I delivered a copy of the foregoing Memorandum, with 
meftts, to Leo G. Kanell, Beaver County Attorney, Attorney 
Stj^ te, at his office in the Beaver Couljty Courthouse on th' 
qf June, 1994. 
John 0. Christiansen, 
Attorney for Defendant 
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John 0. Christiansen '"i'«\ ] (: 
Attorney for Defendant 
P. 0. box 1468 '/-
Beaver, Utah 84 713 *—* •—.~»^m m 
Tel. 438-5412 
THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT!COURT FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE 
STATE OF UTAH, 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS — 
NOTICE OF HEARING--
CERTIFICATE OF SERVIC 
No. 94-CR-36 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JARED KACSUTA, 
Defendant. 
MOTION 
Defendant hexieby moves the court for an order of suppr 
as follows: 
1. Suppressing the arrest and search of Defendant, an 
evidence generated therfrom, in or near Apartment No. 5 in 
apartment building located at 25 West 100 North Street in B 
City, Utah, on or about March 17, 1994. 
2. Suppressing the search of the apartment mentioned 
paragraph "1" hereof, and all evidence generated therefrom, 
on or about March 17, 1994. 
3. Suppressing all evidence of any sale or other de]i 
controlled substances by Defendant to Scott Clemons or any 
person prior to March 17, 1994. 
This Motion i?'based, on [the Constitution of the Unitec 
and the Constitution of Utah,, upon any evidence to be press 
at the hearing,and .Upon memorandum which it is anticipated 
presented. 
John 0. Christiansen, 
Attorney for Defendant 
NOTICE 
TO LBO G. KANELL, BEAVER COUNTY ATTORNEY, ATTORNEY FOR PLAIN 
Please take notice that Defendant will call up the fore 
Motion for hearing and dipsosition before the above-named eo 
the Courtroom in the Beaver County Courthouse at 105 East Ce 
Street in Beaver City, Utah, on the 21st day of June, 1994, 
hour of 10:00 o'clock A.M., or as soon thereafter as the mat 
may be set. 
John 0. Christiansen, 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Motion anc 
on Plaintiff by hand delivering a copy thereof to its attori 
Leo G. Kanell, Beaver County Attorney, at his office in the 
County Courthouse on the 14th day of June, 1994, 
John 0. Christiansen, 
Attorney for Defendant 
LEO G. KANELL 
Beaver County Attorney 
P. 0. Box 471 
Beaver, Utah 84713 
Telephone: (8 01) 438-2 351 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAVER 
STATE OF UTAH, : JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
AND COMMITMENT 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
JARED KACSUTA, : Criminal No. 94-CR-3 
Defendant. 
This matter having regularly come on for se 
before the Honorable J. Philip Eves,* District Court Judg 
19th day of July, 1994, and the Defendant being pres 
represented by his attorney, JOHN 0. CHRISTIANSEN, and P 
being represented by LEO G. KANELL, Beaver County Attorney, 
Defendant having been found guilty by jury verdict of the 
of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DIS 
a second degree felony, in violation of Section 58-37-8(1) 
Utah Code Annotated, as amended, and Defendant's attorne 
made statements to the Court regarding mitigation of sent 
the Defendant having made a statement in his own behalf, 
Court having reviewed the recommendations in a presentenc 
prepared by Utah State Department of Corrections, and t\ 
being fully advised in the premises, now makes and ent 
following Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment. 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED 1 
Defendant, JARED KACSUTA, is guilty of the offense of POSSE 
A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a secon 
felony, in violation of Section 58-37-8(1)(A)(iv) and 58-37 
(ix) and (x), and 58-37-8(5)(c), Utah Code Annotated, as 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED 
Defendant, JARED KACSUTA, is hereby Sentenced to incarcer 
the Utah State Prison on the charge of POSSESSION OF A CC 
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a second degree felony 
indeterminate term of not less than one (1) year nor m 
fifteen (15) years. 
No fine is imposed. 
Further, the court recommends that the Defei 
screened and considered for drug treatment^while in prise 
a condition of parol. 
No restitution is ordered. 
2 
is ordered that the Defendant be delivered to the Utah Stat 
for the execution of said Sentence. 
DATED this j 2 r d a Y o f JulY> 1994. 
J/ PHI LI] 
district Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Beaver) 
I, Paul B. Barton, clerk of said District court ( 
County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the Hono 
PHILIP EVES, whose name is subscribed to the preceding cei 
is the Judge of said Court, duly commissioned and qualif 
that the signature of said Judge to said certificate is c 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have ^ hereunto set my 
ic affixed the seal of the Court tl£i^vI$!£^4ay. of July, 19 
Approved as to Form \\ PAtJL: B. BART,ON 
and Content: Uci^rk'^o^-Mf-th District Coi \\CVzrK:-ofiFl"tf-^h District 
JOHN 0. CHRISTIANSEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
4 
Defendant is hereby notified that he has thirty ( 
from and after July 19, 1994, to appeal this judgment and s 
or any part thereof. Such appeal shall be pursuant to the I 
Criminal and Civil Procedure and the laws of the State of 
DATED this July, 1994. 
BY THE COURT, 
COMMITMENT 
The person of said Defendant, JARED KACSUTA, is 
committed to the custody of the Utah Division of Correct 
the purpose of executing the foregoing Judgment and Sentenc 
3 
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(m) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation 
the license, 
(IV) issue a public or pnvate reprimand to the 
individual, 
(v) issue a cease and desist order, and 
(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 
for each dispensed prescription regarding which the 
required information is not submitted 
(b) Civil penalties assessed under Subsection (a)(vi) 
shall be deposited in the General Fund 
(c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of 
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 58-1-
108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the divi-
sion 
(13) An individual who has submitted information to the 
database in accordance with this section may not be held 
civilly liable for having submitted the information 
(14) (a) All department and the division costs necessary to 
establish and operate the database shall be funded by 
appropriations from the General Fund 
(b) Funding for this section shall be appropriated with-
out the use of any resources within the Commerce Service 
Fund 
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting 
data as required m this section shall be assumed by the 
submitting drag outlet io$s 
58-37-8. P r o h i b i t e d ac t s — P e n a l t i e s . 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful 
for any person to knowingly and intentionally 
(l) produce manufacture, or dispense or to possess 
with intent to produce, manufacture or dispense, a 
controlled or counterfeit substance 
(n) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, 
or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance, 
(in) possess a controlled substance in the course of 
his business as a sales representative of a manufac-
turer or distributor of substances listed in Schedules 
II through V except that he may possess such con-
trolled substances when they are prescribed to him by 
a licensed practitioner, or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance 
with intent to distribute 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) 
with respect to 
(I) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is 
guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction of Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of 
a first degree felony, 
(n) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or 
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon 
a second or subsequent conviction punishable under 
this subsection is guilty of a second degree felony, or 
(in) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subse 
quent conviction punishable under this subsection is 
guilty of a third degree felony 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties 
(a) It is unlawful 
(l) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly 
from a practitioner vvhile acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by 
this subsection, 
(n) for any owner tenant, licensee, or person in 
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, 
aircraft or other place knowingly and intentionally to 
permit them to be occupied by persons un lawf^ 
possessing, using, or distributing controlled $ u / 
stances in any of those locations, 
(in) for any person knowingly and intentionally f. 
be present where controlled substances are bem 
used or possessed m violation of this chapter and th« 
use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and
 not 
concealed from those present, however, a person i^av 
not be convicted under this subsection if the evide^i 
shows that he did not use the substance himself
 0 
advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so, $nv 
incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled sub, 
stances by the defendant may be admitted to rebut 
this defense, 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally u 
possess an altered or forged prescnption or written ] 
order for a controlled substance, 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter 
knowingly and intentionally to prescribe, administer 
or dispense a controlled substance to a juvem]e' 
without first obtainmg the consent required in $4' 
tion 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person stantW 
in loco parentis of the juvenile except in cases of ^ 
emergency, for purposes of this subsection, a juvenile 
means a "child" as defined in Section 78-3a % ^ 
"emergency" means any physical condition requinn? 
the administration of a controlled substance for inj 
mediate relief of pam or suffering, 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter 
knowingly and intentionally to prescnbe or adrainu. 
ter dosages of a controlled substance in excess of! 
medically recognized quantities necessary to treat 
the ailment, malady or condition of the ultimate usef 
or j 
(vn) for any person to prescnbe, administer crj 
dispense any controlled substance to another perscc 
knowing that the other person is using a false name,j 
address, or other personal information for ;he p 
pose of secunng the same 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsectioflj 
(2)(a)(i) with respect to 
(0 marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds orim 
is guilty of a second degree felony, 
(n) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, 
marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, 
less than 100 pounds, is guilty of a third dej 
felony, or 
(in) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in theft 
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, 
the amount is more than one ounce but less thtf 
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor j 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Sub«#*j 
(2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries °f P^jl 
occupied by any correctional facility as defined m ^ J 
64 13-1 or any public jail or other place of confined 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree great* V 
provided in Subsection (2)(b) 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction oi 
sion of any controlled substance by a person P1* 
convicted under Subsection (2)(b), that person s 1 
sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than P 
in this subsection
 v *• 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection ^Xajvj 
respect to all other controlled substances not tftf 
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (n) or (in), including l e s S . ^ 
ounce of manjuana, is guilty of a class B rms 
Upon a second conviction for possession of * 
substance as provided in this subsection, the r 
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miilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or 
subsequent conviction he is guilty of a third degree felony. 
* {{) Any person convicted of violating Subsections 
(2)(a)(ii) through (2)(a)(vii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misde-
meanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(3) Prohibited ac t s C — P e n a l t i e s : 
(a) It is unlawful for any person: 
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or 
dispense a controlled substance in violation of this 
chapter; 
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense a controlled substance to another licensee or 
other authorized person not authorized by his license; 
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol 
required by this chapter or by a rule issued under this 
chapter; 
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any 
record, notification, order form, statement, invoice, or 
information required under this chapter; or 
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection 
as authorized by this chapter. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) 
shall be punished by a civil penalty of not more than 
' $5,000. The proceedings are independent of, and not in 
lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any 
other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by 
information or indictment which alleges the violation was 
committed knowingly or intentionally, that person is upon 
conviction guiltv of a third degree felony 
(4) Prohibited act* D — P e n a l t i e s : 
(a) It is un lawfu l for a n y person knowing ly and i n t e n -
tionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or 
distribution of a controlled substance a license num-
ber which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued 
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a 
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or repre-
sent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apoth-
ecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other au-
thorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or 
attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a 
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any per-
son known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any 
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure 
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled 
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, decep-
tion, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or writ-
ten order for a controlled substance, or the use of a 
false name or address; 
dii) to make any false or forged prescription or 
w nt ten order for a controlled substance, or to utter 
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order 
^sued or written under the terms of this chapter; 
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material infor-
mation in any application, report, or other document 
required to be kept by this chapter or to willfully 
m&ke any false statement in any prescription, order, 
^port, or record required by this chapter; or 
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, 
Plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, 
? r reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other 
1(tentifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any 
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or 
container or labeling so as to render any drug a 
counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4)(a) 
is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a 
person not authorized under this chapter who commits 
any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under 
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and 
classifications under Subsection (5)(b) if the act is com-
mitted: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary 
school or on the grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or 
post-secondary institution or on the grounds of any of 
those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, sta-
dium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the 
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored 
by or through a school or institution under Subsec-
tions (5)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care 
facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or 
recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, 
arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot 
or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsections (5)(aj(u through 
(viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, 
regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of 
a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of 
not less than five years if the penalty that would other-
wise have been established but for this subsection would 
have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of 
the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for parole until the minimum te*rm of imprison-
ment under this subsection has been served. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been 
established would have been less than a first degree 
felony but for this subsection, a person convicted under 
this subsection is guilty of one degree more than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
1
 (d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this 
subsection that the actor mistakenly believed the individ-
ual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense 
or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the 
actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act 
occurred was not as described in Subsection (5)(a) or was 
unaware tha t the location where the act occurred was as 
described in Subsection (5)(a). 
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is 
specified is a class B misdemeanor. 
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any 
offense unlawful under this chapter is upon conviction guilty 
of one degree less than the maximum penalty prescribed for 
that offense. 
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is 
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or administra-
tive penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
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(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal 
law or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal 
under federal law or the law of another state for the same 
act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) (a) When it appeurs to the court at the time of sentenc-
ing any person convicted under this chapter that the 
person has previously been convicted of an offense under 
the laws of this state, the United States, or another state, 
which if committed in this state would be an offense 
within this chapter and it appears that probation would 
not be of benefit to the defendant or that probation would 
be contrary to the interest, welfare, or protection of 
society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if" 
there is compliance with Subsection (9)(b), impose a 
minimum term to be served by the defendant, of up to Vfe 
the maximum sentence imposed by law for the offense 
, committed For violations of this section, this subsection 
supersedes Section 77-18-4. 
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a mini-
mum term as provided in Subsection (9)(a), the pros-
ecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment, shall 
cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in misde-
meanor cases, or the information or indictment, in 
addition to the substantive offense charged, a state-
ment writing forth the alleged past conviction of the 
defendant and specifically stating the date and place 
of conviction and the offense of which the defendant 
was convicted. The allegation shall be presented to 
the defendant at the time of his arraignment, or 
afterwards by leave of court, but in no event later 
than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged 
or the defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the 
time of arraignment or a later date when granted by 
the court, the court shall read the allegation of the 
prr-\ 1 >u.s conviction to the defendant, provide him or 
}, .- . nmsel with a copy >r '?, and explain to the 
deiondant the consequence of the allegation und< -
Subsection (9Xa). The allegation of the past convic-
tion of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial, 
except where the admissibility in evidence of a pre-
vious conviction is otherwise recognized as admis-
sible by law. 
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant 
of the substantive offense charged and prior to impos-
ing sentence, shall inform the defendant of its deci-
sion to impose a minimum sentence under Subsection 
(9Xaj and inquire as to whether the defendant admits 
or denies the previous conviction. If the defendant 
denies the previous conviction, the court shall afford 
him an opportunity to present evidence showing that 
the allegation of the past conviction is erroneous or 
the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant 
was pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter 
of record. Following the evidence, the court shall 
make a finding as to whether the defendant has a 
previous conviction, which finding is final, except for 
a showing of abuse of discretion. Following the find-
ings by the court, the defendant shall be sentenced 
under Subsection (9)(a) or under the appropriate 
penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion 
determines. 
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to proba-
tion who violates that probation is subject to Subsections 
(9)(a) and < 9;(b). 
(d) For violations of this section, Subsection (9) super-
sedes Section 76-3-203.5. 
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, 
evidence or proof which shows a person or persons produced, 
manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a con-
trolled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence a 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the charact* 
of the substance or substances. 
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in ^ 
faith and in the course of his professional practice only and not 
for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administerin 
controlled substances or from causing the substances to k! 
administered by an assistant or orderly under his directio 
and supervision. 
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed un(}e 
this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Sub. 
stances Act who manufactures, distributes, or • 
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or 
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in 
the ordinary course of professional practice or researcher 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and 
legitimate scope of his employment. 
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of 
any provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid 
the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application. J W J 
58-37-9. Investigators — Status of peace officers. 
Investigators for the Department of Commerce shall, for the 
purpose of enforcing the provisions of this chapter, have the 
status of peace officers. w% 
58-37-10. Sea r ch w a r r a n t s — A d m i n i s t r a t i v e inspec-
t ion w a r r a n t s — Inspec t i ons a n d seizures of 
property without warrant. 
(1) Search warrants relating to offenses involving con-
trolled substances may be authorized in the same manners 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 23. 
(2) Issuance and execution of administrative inspection 
warrants shall be as follows: 
(a) Any judpe or magistrate of this state within his 
jurisdiction up m proper oath or afh*-nation showing 
probable cause, may issue warrants for the purpose of 
conducting administrative inspections authorized by this 
act or regulations thereunder and seizures of property 
appropriate to such inspections. Probable cause for pur-
poses of this act exists upon showing a valid public 
interest in the effective enforcement of the act or rulei 
promulgated thereunder sufficient to justify administra-
tive inspection ofche area, premises, building, or convey-
ance in the circumstances specified in the application for 
the warrant. 
(b) A warrant shall issue only upon an affidavit of an 
officer or employee duly designated and having knowledge 
of the facts alleged sworn to before a judge or magistrate 
which establish the grounds for issuing the warrant. If | 
the judge or magistrate is satisfied that grounds for the 
application exist or that there is probable cause to believe 
they exist, he shall issue a warrant identifying the area, 
premises, building, or conveyance to be inspected, the 
purpose of the inspection, and if appropriate, the type<» 
property to be inspected, if any. The warrant shall: 
(i) state the grounds for its issuance and the name 
of each person whose affidavit has been taken W 
support it; 
(ii) be directed to a person authorized by SectiC 
58-37-9 of this act to execute it; 
(iii) command the person to whom it is directed' 
inspect the area, premises, building, or conveys0' 
identified for the purpose specified and if appropn8* 
direct the seizure of the property specified; 
(iv) identify the item or types of property t° 
seized, if any; 
Rule 104 UTAH RULfis OF EVIDENCE 
to the court by offer or was apparent from the context 
within which questions were asked 
(b) R e c o r d of offer a n d ru l i ng . The court may add a n y 
other or further statement which shows the character of the 
evidence, tne form in wnicri it was orferecr', trie objection ma^ e 
and the ruling thereon It may direct the making of an offer
 m ' 
question and answer form 
(c) H e a r i n g of ju ry . In jury cases, proceedings shall ^ e 
cor ducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadm,is_ 
sible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any m e a r ^ 
such as making statements or offers of proof or asking qu^ s . 
tions in the hearing of the jury 
(d) P l a in e r ro r . Nothing in this rule precludes taking 
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although 
they were not brought to the attention of the court 
Rule 104. P r e l i m i n a r y q u e s t i o n s . 
(a) Ques t i ons of admiss ib i l i ty genera l ly . P r e l i m i n ^ 
questions concerning the qualification of a person to b$
 a 
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility
 0f 
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the 
provisions of Subdivision (b) In making its determination it
 1S 
not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect ^0 
privileges 
(b) Re l evancy c o n d i t i o n e d on fact. When the re levarw 
of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fa^t 
the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction
 0f 
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of t^ e 
condition 
(c) H e a r i n g of ju ry . Hearings on the admissibility
 0f 
confessions shall in aff cases be conducted out of the hearing
 Df 
the jury Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be ^0 
conducted when the interests of justice require, or when ^ n 
accused is a witness and so requests 
(d) Tes t imony by accused . The accused does not, ^ v 
testifying upon a preliminary matter become subject to croas 
examiij 1 iun as to other issues v \ je case 
(e) Weight a n d credibi l i ty . This rule does not limit l^ e 
right of 8 party to introduce before the jury evidence releva^ t 
to weight or credibility 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 ) 
Ru le 105. L imi ted admiss ib i l i ty . 
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for oi^e 
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for anoth^ r 
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict t^ e 
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly 
Rule 106. R e m a i n d e r of or r e l a t e d w r i t i n g s o r r^_ 
c o r d e d s t a t e m e n t s . 
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof
 lg 
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require tl^e 
introduction at that time of any other part or any oth^ r 
writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to ^ e 
considered contemporaneously with it 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 ) 
ARTICLE II . JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
Rule 201. J u d i c i a l no t i ce of ad jud ica t ive facts . 
(a) Scope of ru l e . This rule governs only judicial notice c,f 
adjudicative facts 
(b) Kinds of facts . Ajudicially noticed fact must be one nc^ 
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally 
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court o r 
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort t0 
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be Questioned 
(c) When d i sc re t iona ry , A court may take judicial notice* 
whether requested or not 
(d) When m a n d a t o r y . A court shall take judicial noti 
a party and supplied with the necessary , ? ^ 
(e) O p p o r t u n i t y to be hea rd , A party is entitled 
requested by   
mation mf0K 
timels request to an opportunity to be heard as to \vl 
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the man 
noticed In the absence of prior notification, the requests 
be made after judicial notice has been taken ^ 
(f) Time of t a k i n g not ice . Judicial notice may be taUn 
any stage of the proceeding " 
(g) I n s t r u c t i n g jury. In a civil action or proceeding n* 
court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive anyf* 
judicially noticed In a criminal case, the court shall instnw 
the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive 
any fact judicially noticed ^ 
ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTIONS. 
Rule 301. P r e s u m p t i o n s in g e n e r a l in civil actions and 
p roceed ings . 
(a) Effect. In all ci\ ll actions and proceedings not otherwitg 
provided for by statute oi b> these rules, a presumption 
imposes on the party agamst whom it is directed the burden of 
proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is mow 
probable than its existence 
(b) I n c o n s i s t e n t p r e s u m p t i o n s . If presumptions are in-
consistpnt, the presumption applies that is founded upon 
weightier considerations of policy If considerations of policy 
are of equal weight neither presumption applies 
Ru]e 302, Appl icab i l i ty of federa l Jaw in civil actioBi 
a n d p roceed ings . 
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption 
respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense tl 
to which federal law supplies the rule of decision is deter-
mined in accordance with federal law 
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY 
AND ITS LIMITS. 
Rule 401. Defini t ion of " r e l evan t evidence ." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to tht 
determination of the action more probable or less probabb 
than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Re l evan t ev idence gene ra l l y admissible; bS 
r e l e v a n t ev idence inadmiss ib le . 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwW 
provided by the Constitution of the United States or thl 
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rulei,* 
b> othei rules applicable in courts of this state EvideflOl 
v\hich is not relevant is not admissible 
Rule 403. Exc lus ion of r e l e v a n t ev idence on ground*« 
p re jud ice , confusion, o r w a s t e of time. .. 
Although rele\ ant, evidence may be excluded if its probaUTi 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of una* 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading ^ e - l U I ^ ? i ^ 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or nee<* 
presentation of mmu'at ive evidence 
Rule 404. Cha rac t e r ev idence n o t admissible to p*"^ 
conduc t ; excep t ions ; o t h e r cr imes. ^ 
(a) C h a r a c t e r ev idence general ly . Evidence of a Pf ^ 
character or a trait of character is not admission 
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on 
ticular occasion, except rt io^ 
(1) C h a r a c t e r of accused . Evidence of a Pf ^ . 
trait o( character offered by an accused, or by *» 
ecution to rebut the same, 
597 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 412 
(2) C h a r a c t e r of v ic t im. E\ idence of a pertinent trait 
of thniacter of the victim of the cnme offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or 
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim 
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut 
evidence that the victim was the first aggressor, 
(3) Character of witness . Evidence of the character 
of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609 
(b) Other crimes, w rongs , or ac t s . Evidence of other 
:rimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character 
jf a person in order to show action in conformity therewith It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident 
(Amended effective October 1 1992 ) 
Rule 405. Methods of proving character. 
(a) Reputat ion or opinion. In all cases in which evidence 
of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, 
proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by 
testimony in the form of an opinion On cross examination, 
inquir> is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct 
(b) Specific instances of c o n d u c t . In cases in which 
character or a trait of character of a person is essential 
element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made 
of specific instances of that persons conduct 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 j 
Rule 406. Habit; routine practice. 
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of 
an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless 
of the presence of eyewitnesses is relevant to prove that the 
conduct ci rl person or organization on a particular occasion 
was in conformity with the habit oi routine practice 
Rule 407. Subsequent remedial measures . 
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken 
previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, 
evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to 
prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the 
event This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of 
subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such 
as proving ownership, contiol, or feasibility of precautionary 
measures, if controverted, or impeachment 
Rule 408. Compromise and offers to compromise . 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to fur-
nish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a 
valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to 
compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or 
&niount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of 
the claim or its amount Evidence of conduct or statements 
made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible 
fnis mle does not require the exclusion of any evidence 
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the 
tourse of compromise negotiations This rule also does not 
^ u i r e exclusion when the evidence is offered for another 
Purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, 
^gativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to 
^struct a criminal investigation or prosecution 
^ e 409. Payment of medical and similar expenses . 
Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to pay 
^
e<hcal, hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by an injury 
not admissible to prove liability for the injury 
uta 410. Inadmissibil ity of pleas, plea discussions, 
and related statements . 
*,,
 c ePt as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the 
•owing ib not in nn> ci\ ll or criminal proceeding, admissible 
against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant 
in the plea discussions 
(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn, 
(2) a plea of nolo contendere, 
(3) any statement made in the course of anv proceed-
ings under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure or comparable state procedure regarding either 
of the foregoing pleas, or 
(4) any statement made in the course of plea discus 
sions with an attorney for the prosecuting authontv 
which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a 
plea of guilty later withdrawn 
However, such a statement is admissible d) in any proceeding 
wherein another statement made in the course of the same 
plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the state-
ment ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with 
it, or (n) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement 
if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the 
record and in the presence of counsel 
Rule 411. Liability insurance. 
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against 
liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person 
acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully This rule does not 
require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability 
when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, 
ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 ) 
Rule 412. Admissibil i ty of al leged victim's sexual be-
havior or al leged sexual predisposit ion. 
(a) Evidence generally inadmissible. The following evi 
dence is not admissible in any criminal proceeding involving 
alleged sexual misconduct except as provided in paragraphs 
(b) and (c) 
(1) evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim 
engaged in other sexual behavior, and 
(2) evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual 
predisposition 
(b) Exceptions. The following evidence is admissible, if 
otherwise admissible under these rules 
(1) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior b> 
the alleged victim offered to prove -that a person other 
than the accused was the source of the semen, injury, or 
other physical evidence, 
(2) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by 
the alleged victim with respect to the person accused of 
the sexual misconduct offered 
(A) by the accused to prove consent, or 
(B) by the prosecution, and 
(3) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the 
constitutional rights of the defendant 
(c) Procedure to determine admissibility. 
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under paragraph 
(b) must 
(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before 
trial specifically describing the evidence and stating 
the purpose for which it is offered unless the court, for 
good cause, requires a different time for filing or 
permits filing during trial, and 
(B) serve the motion on all parties The prosecutor 
shall timely notify the alleged victim or, when appro-
priate, the alleged victim's guardian or representa-
tive 
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule, the court 
must conduct a heanng in camera and afford the alleged 
victim and parties a right to attend and be heard The 
motion, related papers, and the record of the hearing 
must be sealed and remain under seal unless the court 
orders otherwise 
(Added effective July 1, 1994 ) 
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AKTICI 
gale 
J5 VII. OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
701. Opinion test imony b\ hi} witnesses . 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness 
umon} in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to 
.
 qe opinions or infeiences which are (a* rationally based on 
, perception of the witness and (bj helpful to a clear 
cJerstanding of the witness testimonv or the determination 
.fafactin issue 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 ) 
Rule 702. Testimony by experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier ot fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
jmowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may tes-
tify thereto m the form of an opinion or otherwise 
Rule 703. Bases of opinion testimony by experts . 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an 
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by 
or made known to the expert at or before the hearing If of a 
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field 
in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or 
data need not be admissible in evidence 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 ) 
Rule 704. Opinion on ult imate issue. 
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in 
the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided b\ the tnei of fact 
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental 
state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state 
an opinion or i- r< - nee as to whether the <i» fendant did or did 
not have the n i n state or condition c i mating an element 
of the crime changed or of a defense thf icto Such ultimate 
issues are matters for the trier of fact alone 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 ) 
Rule 705. Disclosure of facts or data underlying expert 
opinion. 
The expert ma\ testify in terms of opinion or inference and 
[pve reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underly-
ing facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise The 
expert may in am event be required to disclose the underlying 
facts or data on cross examination 
Amended effective October 1, 1992 ) 
Rule 706. Court-appointed experts. 
(a) Appointment. I h e court may on its own motion or on 
he motion of an> party enter an order to show cause why 
l
xpert witness s should not be appointed, and may request 
he parties to submit nominations The court may appoint an> 
'Xpert witnesses agreed upon by the parties and may appoint 
>xpert witnesses of its own selection An expert witness shall 
1Qt be appointed by the court unless the witness consents to 
|ct A witness so appointed shall be informed of the witness' 
•uties by the court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed 
sith the clerk, or at a conference in which the parties shall 
l a ve opportunity to participate A witness so appointed shall 
'dvise the parties of the witness'findings, if any, the witness' 
'^position may be taken by any party, and the witness may be 
a
'ied to testify by the court or any party The witness shall be 
ubject to cross examination by each party, including a party 
a
^ n g the witness 
(o) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed aie 
ntitled to reasonable compensation in whatever sum the 
°urt may allov The compensation thus fixed is payable from 
mds which ma> be provided by law in criminal cases and civil 
etions and proceedings involving just oompesahon under the 
Fifth Amendment In other civil actions and proceedings the 
compesation shall be paid b> the parties in such proportion 
,3nd at such tune as the court direct, and thereafter charged in 
like manner as other costs 
(c) Disclosure of appointment. In the exercise of its 
discretion, the court mav authorize disclosure to the jury of 
the fact that the court appointed the expert witness 
(d) Parties' experts of own selection. Nothing in this 
rule limits the parties in calling expert witnesses of their own 
selection 
(Amended effective October 1 1992 ) 
ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY. 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article 
(a) Statement. A 'statement" is (1) an oral or written 
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is 
intended by the person as an assertion 
(b) Declarant. A declarant' is a person who makes a 
statement 
(c) Hearsay. 'Hearsav ' is a statement, other than one 
made b} the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
hearing offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted 
(d) Statements w hich are not hearsay. A statement 
is not hearsay if 
0 ) Prior statement by witness. The declarant 
testifies at the tual or bearing and is subject to 
cross examination concprnmg the statement and the 
statement i« (A) inconsistent with the declarant's 
testimony or the witness denies having made the 
statement or h »*> forgotten, or (B) consistent with the 
declarant's t c ^ r »v and is offered to rebut an 
express or unpin i charge against the declarant of 
recent fabrics tion or improper influence or motive, or 
(C) one of identification of a person made after 
perceiving the person, or 
{2} Admission by party-opponert. The state-
ment is offered against a party and is (A) the party's 
own statement, in eithe r an individual or a represen-
tative capacitv or B) a statement of which the party 
has manifested an adoption or Relief in its truth, or 
(C) a statement bv a person authorized by the party 
to make a statement concerning the subject or (D) a 
statement by the party s agent or servant concerning 
a matter within the scope of the agency or employ-
ment, made during the existence of the relationship, 
or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party 
during the course and in furtherance of the conspir-
acy 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 ) 
Rule 802. Hearsay rule. 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by 
these ruleb 
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant 
immaterial . 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even 
though the declarant is available as a witness 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describ-
ing or explaining an event or condition made while the 
declarant was perceiving the event or condition or imme-
diately thereafter 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a 
startling event or condition made while the declarant was 
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition 
Rule 610 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of the punishment 
(b) T ime limit . Evidence of a conviction under this rule is 
not admissible if a penod of more than ten years has elapsed 
since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness 
from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever 
is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests 
of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported 
by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its 
prejudicial effect However, evidence of a conviction more than 
ten years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless'the 
proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient ad\ance writ 
ten notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such 
evidence 
(c) Effect of p a r d o n , a n n u l m e n t , or cer t i f ica te of re-
hab i l i t a t i on . Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under 
this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, 
annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent 
procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person 
convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subse 
quent cnme which was punishable by death or imprisonment 
in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject 
of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based 
on a finding of innocence 
(d) J u v e n i l e a d j u d i c a t i o n s . Evidence of juvenile adjudi-
cations is generally not admissible under this rule The court 
may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile 
adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction 
of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of 
an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence 
is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or 
innocence 
(e) P e n d e n c y of a p p e a l . The pendency of an appeal there 
from does not renuti evidence of a conviction inadmissible 
Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 ) 
Rule 610. Rel ig ious beliefs o r op in ions . 
Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of 
religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by 
reason of their nature the witness' credibility is impaired or 
enhanced 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 ) 
Rule 611. Mode a n d o r d e r of I n t e r r o g a t i o n a n d p r e s e n -
t a t ion . 
(a) Con t ro l by c o u r t The court shall exercise reasonable 
control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses 
and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation 
and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth 
(2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect wit 
nesses from harassment or undue embarrassment 
(b) Scope of c ross -exa ih ina t ion . Cross examination 
should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examina-
tion and matters affecting the credibility of the witness The 
court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into 
additional matters as if on direct examination 
(c) L e a d i n g q u e s t i o n s . Leading questions should not be 
used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be 
necessary to develop the witness' testimony Ordinarily lead-
ing questions should be permitted on cross examination 
When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a 
witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation ma> be 
by leading questions 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 ) 
Rule 612. Wri t ing u s e d to re f resh m e m o r y 
If a witness uses a writing to refresh (he witness memory 
for the purpose of testifying, either ' 
(1) while testifying, or 
(2) before testifying, if the court in its d i s c r e t i o n ^ 
mines it is necessary in the interests of justice, ^ 
an adverse part} is entitled to have the writing prodiw 
the hearing, to inspect it, to cross examine the \y5 
thereon and to introduce in evidence those portions -«& 
i elate to the testimony of the witness If it is claimed that 
writing contains matters not related to the subject mattJS 
the testimony the court shall examine the wnting m caim^ 
excise an) portions not so related, and order delivery
 0f^j? 
remainder to the party entitled thereto Any portion withy! 
over objections shall be preserved and made available toflj 
appellate court in the event of an appeal If a wnting
 la?J 
produced or delivered pursuant to order under this rule tiJ 
court shall make any order justice requires, except that? 
criminal cases when the prosecution elects not to comply tk 
order shall be one striking the testimony or, if the court info 
discretion determines that the interests of justice so reqmn 
declaring a mistrial 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 ) 
Rule 613. P r i o r s t a t e m e n t s of w i t n e s s e s . 
(a) E x a m i n i n g wi tnes s c o n c e r n i n g p r i o r statement.^ 
examining a witness concerning a prior statement made to 
the w ltness, whether written or not, the statement need notbe 
shown nor its contents disclosed to the witness at that time, 
but on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to 
opposing counsel 
(b) Ex t r i n s i c ev idence of p r i o r inconsis tent stat* 
m e n t of u l tness . Extrinsic evidence of a pnor inconsistent 
statement b> a witness is not admissible unless the witness^ 
afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and list 
opposite partv is afforded an opportunity to interrogate tht 
witness thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. 
Th p vision does not apph to admissions of a parH 
opp^n^nt as defined in Rult jOUd)(2) 
(Amendf d effective October 1, 1992 ) 
Rule 614 Cal l ing a n d i n t e r r o g a t i o n of witnesses by 
cou r t . 
(a) Cal l ing by cour t . The court may, on its own motion at 
at the suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties an 
entitled to cross examine witnesses thus called 
(b) I n t e r r o g a t i o n by cou r t . The court may lnterrogaB 
witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party 
(c) Objec t ions . Objections to the calling of witnesses by th 
court or to mteirogation by it may be made at the time or* 
the next available opportunity when the jury is not present 
Rule 615. Exc lus ion of w i tne s se s . 
(1) At the request of a party the court shall order witness* 
excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of otto 
witnesses, and it may make the order on its own motion Ta 
rule does not authorize exclusion of 
(a) a party who is a natural person, 
(b) an officer or employee of a party which is not 
natural person designated as its representative by' 
attorney, 
tc) a person whose presence is shown by a party to 
essential to the presentation of the party's cause, or 
(d) an adult victim in a criminal trial where the pr 
ecutor agrees with the victim's presence 
(2) The court may exclude or excuse a victim fr°m 
courtroom if the victim becomes disruptive 
(3) An adult victim in a criminal trial who elects to 
present in the courtroom may not be prevented from tes& 
mg even after being present and having heard other t£ 
monv 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 ) 
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